MONEY ISLAND MARINA, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROGER MAURO and LOIS MAURO, their heirs, devisees, and personal representatives, and his, her, their, or any of their successors in right, title, and interest, Defendants-Respondents.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Terance J. Bennett, attorney for appellant.
The D'Elia Law Firm LLC, attorneys for respondents (Teresa M. Lentini, on the brief).
Before Judges Fisher and Espinosa.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
PER CURIAM.
In this appeal, plaintiff Money Island Marina, LLC (MIM) argues that the findings made by the trial judge in dismissing its claims at the conclusion of a bench trial were either based on erroneous legal rulings or were contrary to the weight of the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.
The issues posed in this civil action are limited and discrete. MIM, a limited liability company ostensibly controlled by Tony Novak (Novak),[1] seeks a declaration, by way of this quiet title action, that defendant Lois Mauro's mortgage on the property should be invalidated or have no further impact on its ownership rights. MIM argues, however, that the case should be considered in light of other circumstances, some of which have been resolved in other proceedings. That is, MIM contends that defendant Roger Mauro (Mauro) assaulted Novak by vehicle in 2006 and that this circumstance, and the resulting personal injury action he commenced, should have been more fully considered in the disposition of this quiet title action. We described the vehicular assault allegations in earlier opinions in a criminal matter commenced against Mauro.[2] In or about 2008, Novak brought a personal injury action against Mauro.[3]
Of greater relevance to the matter at hand is the fact that in 1995, Mauro purchased a marina in Downe Township and then, on December 12, 2008, sold the marina to Joseph Acosta for $425,000, receiving more than $100,000 in cash and a purchase money mortgage to secure repayment of a note payable to Mauro from Acosta of the principal amount of $313,000.
At a hearing in bankruptcy court on November 13, 2012, Novak bid $12,000 to purchase the marina. When the bankruptcy judge asked Novak if he understood the marina is "subject to the mortgage that's on the property," Novak responded, "Yes." An order entered by the bankruptcy court on November 26, 2012, confirmed the sale of the marina to Novak "or his assignee" for $12,000 "subject to all liens, mortgages and encumbrances on the real estate." The next day, the bankruptcy trustee executed a quitclaim deed in MIM's favor; the deed acknowledged that the grantor had made "no promises as to ownership or title, but simply transfers whatever interest the [g]rantor [i.e., the trustee] has to the [g]rantee [i.e., MIM]." This recitation is in accord with what it means to convey a property interest by quitclaim deed. See N.J.S.A. 46:5-3. The quitclaim deed was recorded on December 12, 2012. On May 16, 2013, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion to expunge Lois's proof of claim in light of the fact that the mortgage remained attached to the property transferred to MIM.
On February 14, 2013, MIM, as the assignee of the marina purchased by Novak through the bankruptcy court, filed this quiet title action. A few months later, Novak's personal injury action against Mauro settled; Novak received $5000, and Mauro obtained a general, unconditional release of Novak's claims. Lois commenced an action seeking to foreclose her mortgage on the marina.
MIM's quiet title action and Lois's foreclosure action were both the subject of a single bench trial conducted over the course of two days. The trial judge rightfully expressed in her written opinion that "[t]here is something very odd about this litigation and the manner in which the parties have pursued or defended against claims." For example, MIM claimed that Novak's settlement of the personal injury action somehow provided MIM with ownership of the marina free of the mortgage; however, as the judge observed, the release that memorialized the settlement contains no such condition or agreement, and the judge found no other evidence to support MIM's contention.[4] And, while Novak may have thought, as the judge stated, that he had "outwitt[ed] the Mauros by outbidding them at the bankruptcy hearing" for the marina, the bankruptcy record clearly demonstrates that the interest in the marina which Novak purchased was taken subject to Lois's mortgage. The judge's findings also demonstrate that Roger's assignment of the mortgage to Lois was supported by adequate consideration; she noted that Mauro's financial circumstances had long been troubled by Acosta's failure to make the monthly payments required by the note and mortgage, as well as his many other legal matters, including those involving Novak, resulting in Lois providing Mauro with $200,000 for his support, for which she was compensated by assignment of the mortgage. The judge's findings, based upon what is both clearly demonstrated by the various documents and transcripts emanating from the bankruptcy proceeding and the personal injury settlement, as well as by the judge's careful assessment of the credibility of the many witnesses, are entitled to our deference. Rova Farms Resort Co. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974); Stephenson v. Spiegle, 429 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2013).
Accordingly, with these few comments, we affirm the dismissal of the quiet title action substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Anne McDonnell in her well-reasoned written decision.[5]
Affirmed.
[1] To add to some of the confusion about the underlying circumstances, the actual owner of MIM has not been adequately disclosed. At his deposition, Novak asserted he is MIM's "authorized representative," but he denied knowledge about the identity of the owners, saying: "[w]e are trying to figure it out. We do have a dispute and I do not know." Upon further questioning, he identified one of the disputed owners as his stepson and disclosed without clarity that other members "have since abandoned" ownership or otherwise "disavow[ed] and resign[ed]."
[2] On February 21, 2013, we reversed the trial court's dismissal of the criminal prosecution, finding no violation of Mauro's speedy trial rights. State v. Mauro, No. A-4950-11 (App. Div. Feb. 21, 2013). The Supreme Court later remanded for our reconsideration in light of State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253 (2013), but we again came to the same conclusion. State v. Mauro, No. A-4950-11 (App. Div. June 10, 2014).
[3] The date the personal injury complaint was filed is not disclosed in the record on appeal. The filing date, however, is not particularly relevant; we assume the complaint was filed in 2008 because of its docket number.
[4] Indeed, Mauro was no longer the owner of the mortgage; it had been assigned to Lois well before Novak and Mauro settled the personal injury action. The mortgage was not something available to Mauro to negotiate with.
[5] By way of the same written decision, the judge determined that the answer and counterclaim filed by Novak and MIM in Lois's foreclosure action were non-contesting. Consequently, the judge referred the matter to the Office of Foreclosure for entry of final judgment, subject to any dispute about the amount of the judgment or MIM's right to a fair market credit or other equitable relief. MIM does not present an argument here regarding the judge's disposition of the foreclosure issues; indeed, MIM correctly recognizes that, until entry of final judgment in the foreclosure action, it has no right to file a notice of appeal in that regard.
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